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Abstract: 
Welfare benefits in the U.S. have experienced a much-studied secular decline since the mid-1970s. We explore 
a new hypothesis for this decline related to the increase in wage inequality in the labor market and the decline of 
real wages at the bottom of the distribution: we posit that voters prefer benefits which are tied to low-skilled 
wages. We test the hypothesis using a 1969–1992 panel of state-level data. An additional contribution of our 
analysis is the use of General Social Survey data on voter preferences for welfare which we combine with 
Current Population Survey data to determine the voter in each state who has the median preferred welfare 
benefit level. Our analysis reveals considerable evidence in support of a role for declining real wages in the 
decline of welfare benefits. 
Author Keywords: Welfare benefits; USA; Wage inequality 
 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Welfare benefits in the United States paid to persons through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program, the main cash assistance program for the poor from 1935 through 1997, declined in real 
terms from the late 1960s through the 1990s. State legislatures, which set nominal benefit levels, failed to raise 
those levels to a degree sufficient to keep up with inflation, and in recent years sometimes even reduced 
nominal benefit levels. Other major welfare programs – most notably the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs – 
grew in the early 1970s, causing the sum of all three benefits to rise, but even this benefit sum declined in real 
terms after the mid-1970s. While the rate of benefit decline slowed in the 1980s, and may even have flattened 
out, real benefits in the welfare system today are not much above what they were in 1970. 
 
Considerable scholarly attention has been focused on the causes of this decline. The ―demand‖ for welfare 
benefits has been treated with a public good model at least since Orr (1976), which, in its simplest variant, 
implies that income and price should determine demand. But real income in the aggregate and in all states has 
risen over the last 25 years, albeit at a slower rate than in earlier periods; and none of the variables affecting the 
tax price of state welfare benefits (federal matching rates, the AFDC caseload itself, etc.) have changed enough, 
or in a consistent fashion throughout the period, to provide a satisfactory explanation. The hypothesis that the 
federally-funded Food Stamp program may have ―displaced‖ the AFDC program has also been studied (Orr, 
1979 and Gramlich, 1982 and Moffitt, 1990a) with contradictory results across studies. Another hypothesis is 
that non-AFDC welfare expenditures, especially Medicaid, have risen rapidly and have crowded out AFDC 
expenditures. The results in the literature to date indicate, at best, weak evidence for this hypothesis as well 
(Moffitt, 1990a and Ribar and Wilhelm, 1994). 
 
The hypothesis that we explore in this paper is related to the increase in wage inequality in the U.S., which has 
been the subject of much attention in recent years (see Levy and Murnane, 1992, for a review of the early 
studies). An oft-noted, and important feature of that trend, is a decline not only in wage rates in the lower tail of 
the distribution relative to higher-skilled groups, but also an absolute decline in lower-tail real wages. If voters 
wish to maintain a target benefit–wage ratio, either for reasons of equity with the nonwelfare working poor or to 
control work disincentives, a fall in the low-skill wage could lead voters to reduce welfare benefit levels. This 
stands in contrast to the standard view that a reduction in unskilled wages, by raising poverty rates, leads voters 
to increase benefit levels. 
 
We test this hypothesis with a panel of U.S. state-level data over the period 1969–1992 with information on 
both benefits and low-skilled wages. Our preferred test uses now-conventional state fixed effects estimation, 
where estimates are based on the correlation between changes over time in welfare benefits, on the one hand, 
and changes over time in low-skilled wages, on the other, across different states. We find considerable evidence 
that the drift in wages has played a contributory role. At the state level, year-to-year changes in benefits and 
low-skill wages are positively correlated across states, both unconditionally and conditional on a set of other 
regressors including controls for income and price effects. In addition, long-term trends in benefits and wages 
(after smoothing out fluctuations) are also positively related across states. 
 
An additional feature of our analysis relates to the median voter model which underlies our analysis and most of 
those in the literature. While we take the median voter model as a maintained hypothesis in our work, we use 
data on individual preferences for welfare to circumvent the aggregation problem that arises when only state-
level data on median income and population characteristics are available, a problem discussed by Bergstrom 
and Goodman (1973). Using a question on welfare preferences from a nationwide survey (the General Social 
Survey), we are able to estimate the income and socioeconomic characteristics of the median-preference voter 
in each state and use those as regression determinants of the state benefit level, thereby freeing the analysis 
from the very restrictive assumptions given by Bergstrom and Goodman necessary to justify the use of, and 
interpret the results from using, aggregate data. 
 
The next section of the paper briefly describes trends in welfare benefits and related variables. Following that, 
we discuss conceptual aspects of the hypothesis in more detail. After a discussion of modeling and data 
considerations, we present our empirical results. A summary concludes the paper. 
 
2. Trends in welfare benefits in the U.S. 
That welfare benefits have declined markedly over the last twenty years is well-known. Fig. 1 shows the trend 
in the sum of the real AFDC and Food Stamp guarantees, the maximum payments for a family of four with no 
other income, over the period 1970–1993. The essentially monotonic downward trend reflects a more or less 
constant real Food Stamp benefit (Food Stamps are indexed to inflation) and a nominal AFDC benefit which 
has been rising slower than the rate of inflation. In the early 1990s, some states also reduced their nominal 
AFDC benefits. Fig. 2 shows the time trend in the real weekly wage (1987 dollars) measured at the 25th 
percentile of the distribution.
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 The figure shows that this measure of the unskilled wage declined for most of the 
period, although with fluctuations around trend, until the late 1980s, after which it has risen slightly. Other 
figures (not shown) show similar declines for the wages of high school graduates and at the 10th percentile of 
the wage distribution. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Real monthly AFDC+ food stamp guarantee 1970–1993. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. 25th percentile of real weekly wage distribution 1970–1993. 
 
 
Fig. 3 shows the trend in the ratio of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits to the 25th-percentile wage over the 
period. While the ratio exhibits some fluctuation, it has fallen fairly steadily over time. However, the rate of 
decline is considerably reduced from that of the benefit alone in Fig. 1. We take this observation as the starting 
point for our analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Benefit wage ratio 1970–1993. 
 
3. Modeling the influence of wages on benefits 
There is an extensive public-economics literature on models of the state-level determination of AFDC benefits 
(Pauly, 1973; Orr, 1976; Orr, 1979; Gramlich, 1982; Plotnick and Winter, 1985; Moffitt, 1984; Moffitt, 1990a; 
Plotnick, 1986; Brown and Oates, 1987; Johnson, 1988; Shroder, 1995 and Ribar and Wilhelm, 1996, to name 
just a few). The standard model of redistribution from nonpoor to poor assumes that the existence of a group of 
poor persons imposes a negative externality on the utility of the nonpoor; optimal desires for redistribution then 
involve a balance between the marginal utility of redistribution and the income and efficiency losses attendant 
upon it (Atkinson, 1987). Because the AFDC program is largely a state-level program in the U.S., the literature 
on the determinants of AFDC benefits has translated the model of optimal redistribution to the local level, first 
theoretically by Pauly (1973) and then, in the first serious empirical application, by Orr (1976). The model 
assumes that each voter cares about his own income and, altruistically, about the income of a representative 
poor family, and that majority rule in a single-issue election leads to a benefit chosen by the median-preference 
voter. The other articles referenced above pursued theoretical and empirical variants on this theme. In the 
standard forms of these models, a decrease in the income of the poor leads to a increase in the marginal benefit 
of redistribution and hence to an increase in the equilibrium welfare benefit. We wish to posit models that could 
generate the opposite result. 
 
We base our model, as is typical in the literature, on the utility function of the nonpoor voter on the assumption 
that poor voters are insufficiently large in number to generate a median voter. We consider three different types 
of variables affecting the utility of a representative nonpoor voter: consumption (C), hours of work (H), and 
other socioeconomic characteristics (X). Again following the standard formulation, we separate the arguments 
of the utility function into those of the individual himself and those of other individuals in the population. A 
general formulation of this utility function is: 
 
 
(1)  
 
where C, H, and X denote quantities for the nonpoor individual himself and those variables in curly brackets 
with subscript −1 denote those variables for the residual set of individuals, presumed to include the target 
population for redistribution. It is important to note that a function as general as Eq. 1 can capture preferences 
for redistribution based not only on the absolute levels of C and H of the target population, but on their levels 
relative to those of the nonpoor individual himself. Thus if voters have a target level of inequality per se in 
mind, represented perhaps by a desired ratio of consumption, this can be captured in Eq. 1. ―Relative income‖ 
theories of redistribution are of this type. Relatedly, the presence of the X characteristics is capable of 
representing not only the effect on redistributional preferences of the characteristics of the individual himself 
and those of the members of the target population, but also of the relationship between the two. This could 
matter if similarity or dissimilarity in characteristics between the donor and the recipient influence preferences, 
as in models of ―social distance‖ (Kristov et al., 1992 and Cutler et al., 1993). 
 
A stylized specialization of Eq. 1 can capture most of the important preference influences of interest here. 
Suppose that the target population can be considered to be composed of two homogeneous groups, one 
consisting of poor individuals receiving public assistance (A) and one consisting of poor individuals not 
receiving public assistance (NA). With additional separability assumptions between C and H, we have: 
 
 
(2)  
 
where we have taken the labor supply of the nonpoor individual himself (H) to be exogenous. The budget 
constraint facing the individual is 
 
 
(3)
 
 
(4)  
 
where Y is the income level of the individual, B is the level of the welfare benefit, R is the number of individuals 
on welfare (i.e., the caseload), N is the population in the state, and k(Y) is a function nondecreasing in Y which 
represents the form of the tax function in the state. Thus Q(Y) is the price of a one-dollar increase in B to an 
individual with income Y, and that price depends on the state per-capita caseload. We ignore federal subsidies 
for the time being. 
 
To adequately capture the effects of benefits and unskilled wages on desired benefits, we add a set of functions 
describing the consumption, hours, and welfare-take-up decisions of poor individuals as follows, where W is the 
level of the wage for unskilled workers: 
 
 
(5)
 
 
(6)
 
 
(7)
 
 
Given these functions, the optimal desired B can be obtained by taking the derivative of Eq. 2 w.r.t. B to obtain 
the marginal utility of increasing the benefit: 
 
 
(8)  
 
where ε=[(B/R)(∂R/∂B)] is the elasticity of the caseload w.r.t. the benefit. Optimal benefits are chosen by 
balancing the disutility of the reduction in consumption induced by the additional taxes needed to raise benefits, 
including any caseload increase that results, and the net utility of increasing the consumption of the poor at the 
expense of some reductions in their hours of work. 
 
Although it is often presumed that higher income voters are more altruistic than middle-income voters, and that 
welfare benefits are in this sense a normal good, this does not imply that desired benefits are positively related 
to income. Taking the derivative of Eq. 8 w.r.t. Y, we have: 
 
 
(9)  
 
While it is true that the middle term in this expression implies (assuming that [1−Q′(Y)B] is positive) that 
declining marginal utility of own consumption (V11<0) leads to an increase in the desire for redistribution as 
income rises, the first term shows that an increase in tax payments as income rises may offset this. Less obvious 
is the third term, whose sign is determined by the sign of V21, the effect of an increase in own consumption on 
the marginal utility of increasing the consumption of poor welfare recipients. Although there could be some 
type of ―pure‖ positive income effect on redistribution, reflected in V21>0, it is also possible that sympathy for 
the poor falls as ―distance‖ from them (in income or consumption terms) grows; this would lead to V21<0 and 
hence a decline in preferred benefits among those with higher income. 
 
An implication of this point that is important for our empirical findings is that income effects may differ in sign 
depending on whether Y is increased only for the nonpoor voter in question, holding constant the income and 
consumption of the poor, or whether the entire income distribution shifts (e.g., through economic growth over 
time). If, for example, V21 is a negative function of the C/CP
A
 ratio, a shift upward in the entire distribution 
could generate a positive income effect whereas an increase in the income of one voter alone could generate a 
negative income effect. Empirical counterparts that would correspond to these different comparisons are, on the 
one hand, cross-sectional comparisons of benefit preferences of voters with different incomes – where absolute 
income effects cannot be separated from relative income effects – versus, on the other hand, comparisons over 
time of the benefit preferences of a population whose entire income distribution has shifted upward or 
downward. 
 
The effect of the unskilled wage on benefit preferences is of key interest to us. Taking the partial derivative of 
Eq. 8 w.r.t. W, we have: 
 
 
(10)  
 
The first two terms represent the effects of a change in W on the welfare caseload, which affects the tax price to 
the voter. These effects are ambiguous in sign because, although ∂Q/∂W<0, the signs of ∂ε/∂W and V21 are not 
signable; the latter again represents relative income, social distance influences (in fact, a drop in poor 
consumption from a decline in W could increase social distance and lead to less desire for redistribution). The 
third and fourth terms represent effects working through the relative preferences of voters for the consumption 
and work hours of poor nonwelfare recipients. Of particular interest are the effects working through the cross 
utility terms V23 and Z12, which represent the voter's relative preferences for welfare and nonwelfare 
consumption and work hours. If V23>0, for example, as would arise if voters wish to maintain a target 
consumption ratio between the two poor groups, a decline in the wage will lead to a decline in the marginal 
utility of benefits. If Z12>0, this could lead to the opposite result, however—if low wages cause the hours of 
work of nonwelfare recipients to decline, voters may be less bothered by the work disincentives experienced by 
welfare recipients. 
 
Thus the model offers at least three reasons why benefits may fall if unskilled wages also fall: (i) falling wages 
induce greater caseloads and hence drive up the cost of a marginal increase in benefits; (ii) associated with the 
increase in caseload is a increase in work disincentives, which voters may dislike; and (iii) falling wages may 
create a gap between welfare and nonwelfare working poor which voters may wish to reduce by benefit 
reductions. 
 
Turning to the preferences of the poor voters themselves, those preferences are, as noted earlier, unlikely to be 
decisive in voting; however, their preferences do matter because they help determine who the median voter is. 
Poor voters are likely to prefer higher welfare benefits for self-interest reasons, and may prefer them even if 
they are not on welfare because they might go on in the future; for them, benefits may play the role of insurance 
(Varian, 1980).
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 Consequently, we should expect preferences for benefits to fall with income at the lower 
ranges. 
 
3.1. Aggregation of preferences 
Now consider a model in which different voters i=1,…, Ns in different states s=1,…, S have preferences of the 
type we have just described. We can write a reduced-form benefit-demand function for individual i in state s as: 
 
 
(11)
where Bis* 
 
is the desired benefit level, Qis is the tax price, Yis is income, Xis is a composite set of the X characteristics 
previously defined; and Ws is the level of the unskilled wage in the state. We expect price effects to be negative 
and income effects to be positive or negative, as described earlier, and we wish to test whether unskilled wages 
positively affect the benefit. 
 
We take the median voter model, originally developed by Hotelling (1929), Bowen (1943), as a maintained 
hypothesis for our analysis. Although stable public choice under majority rule requires single-peaked 
preferences (which may not hold) as well as single-issue elections (whereas welfare benefits are chosen by state 
legislatures and governors who run in multiple-issue elections), it is unfortunately the case that equilibria in 
multiple issue elections are difficult to obtain except under very simple preference assumptions or without 
additional political structure imposed. We therefore leave progress on this front to future research. Thus, 
denoting the individual with median Bis* in a state by i=m, the actual welfare benefit in state s is: 
 
 
(12)
 
 
Even with the maintained assumption of median voter choice, however, major estimation difficulties have 
arisen in the literature, some of which interact with our aim of estimating effects of state-level variables like the 
unskilled wage. The most serious difficulty is that neither Eq. 11 nor Eq. 12 can ordinarily be estimated because 
Eq. 11 requires information on individual preferences, which are generally unavailable, and because Eq. 12 
requires knowledge of the characteristics of the median voter, which are also generally unknown because the 
median-preference voter, even in a micro data set, cannot be identified. Because the demand function in Eq. 11 
contains multiple variables, the median of the dependent variable does not correspond in general to the median 
of any of the variables in the function, including income; the median of the dependent variable depends on the 
distribution of all of the variables and on the unknown coefficients which weight up those variables to a 
preference value.
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The conventional solution to this problem is to use aggregate, state-level variables in the estimation of Eq. 12 
instead-specifically, the median income in the state, a tax price based on median income, and the mean 
population characteristics in place of X. Unfortunately, the conditions under which estimation of such an 
equation yields estimates of the function in Eq. 12 are extremely stringent, as demonstrated by Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973). The most important restriction is that the income distributions within all subgroups defined 
by the X characteristics within a state must be proportional shifts of one another. The difficulty with this 
assumption in our case is that, if it fails, the unskilled wage in the state may proxy deviations in the income 
distribution from proportionality and hence deviations in the income of the median-preference person from 
median income. Hence any significant estimated effects of the unskilled wage may be spurious and may reflect 
influences of, rather than on, the median voter.
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Our approach to this problem is to first estimate conventional models using aggregate state-level data, which 
will be valid under the Bergstrom-Goodman conditions, but also to use a micro-level data set on welfare 
preferences to obtain the actual income and characteristics of the voter with median preferences. Welfare 
preference information is available from a survey, the General Social Survey (GSS), which asks direct questions 
about preferences for welfare spending. We use the GSS to estimate demand functions for individual 
preferences as a function of income and other characteristics, and then apply these estimated functions to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) on a state-by-state basis to determine the median-preference individual and 
his or her characteristics (we use the CPS because the GSS sample sizes by state are too small for reliable 
estimation of the median). We then use these characteristics in Eq. 12 and compare the results to those of the 
aggregate model. This will furnish an implicit test of the Bergstrom-Goodman conditions as a whole, and will 
also provide us with an estimate of the effects of the unskilled wage not dependent on any of those conditions.
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4. Results: conventional aggregate model 
For the aggregate analysis we employ a data set consisting of all U.S. states in each year from 1969 to 1992. 
Definitions and descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable is the 
log of the real monthly AFDC benefit per recipient. We also test the AFDC guarantee (maximum amount 
payable to a family of four), which has been used in a fair number of previous studies. We prefer benefits per 
recipient because they more accurately reflect the influence of deductions and other benefit-formula factors not 
easily captured in the guarantee; on the other hand, the benefit captures some income and family-size variation 
as well. Fortunately, the two variables are highly positively correlated and our results, for the most part, do not 
depend on which measure is used. 
Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics  
 
 
 
 
The regressors in the equations include total personal income per capita in the state, the benefit price assuming 
uniform taxation and with federal matching (hence k(Y)=1 and the tax price is multiplied by one minus the 
federal matching rate), an unskilled wage variable in the state, and a set of demographic and political 
characteristics (percent black, percent aged, etc.).
6
 The wage variable is computed from the March files of the 
CPS from 1969 to 1992. In each year, we compute the real average weekly wage (1987 dollars) of all workers 
in each state aged 16–64 and then select the wage at the 25th percentile of the distribution to proxy the wage for 
unskilled workers. We also compute other percentile points, the 10th percentile for example, and test them later 
in the paper. We use weekly wages rather than hourly wages because the CPS does not have a good measure of 
hours worked per week over the years prior to 1976. Past work has indicated, however, that hourly and weekly 
wages are highly correlated.
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Table 2 shows the results using the log of real AFDC benefits per recipient as the dependent variable. Column 
(1) includes only the income and price variables, as well as year dummies, and reveals significant positive and 
negative effects of each, respectively. Column (2) shows the effect of adding the unskilled wage, which has a 
significantly negative coefficient. However, when state-level fixed effects are added, as shown in column (3), 
the coefficient reverses in sign and becomes significantly positive. 
 
The change of results with the introduction of state fixed effects is common in the literature and is unsurprising. 
It arises in the present case because many high-benefit states in the U.S. also have low real wages but, over 
time, states with more rapidly falling wages have experienced more rapidly falling benefits.
8
 Since a 
specification test clearly rejects column (2), the implication is that the cross-sectional relationship is spuriously 
picking up fixed unobserved taste and other omitted state-level variables that are positively correlated with 
benefits but negatively correlated with wages. 
 
The positive correlation between changes in benefits and wages over time is strong enough that it can be seen 
from a simple examination of the relationship between unconditional growth rates of benefits and wages by 
region, as shown in Table 3.
9
 The table shows the change in average log benefits and log wages between two 
11-year periods, 1969–1980 and 1981–1992 (our time period split in half). Log wages are measured relative to 
the median, to control for differences in the growth rate of the whole wage distribution and not just its lower 
portion. As the table indicates, benefits fell the most between the 1970s and 1980s in the mid-Atlantic region 
(New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania), and fell the least in the Pacific region (California, Alaska, Hawaii, 
and northwestern states). At the same time, inequality in the lower-tail of the wage distribution increased the 
most in the first group and increased less (in fact, decreased) for the latter group of states. Other groups fit this 
pattern as well: the industrial states of the Midwest (Michigan and Ohio, for example), experienced large 
increases in inequality and also reduced AFDC benefits by sizable amounts. The southeastern states in the U.S., 
which reduced benefits by very little compared to the rest of the country, also experienced little growth in 
inequality.
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Table 2. State-level regression analysis of determinants of AFDC benefits 
 
 
Table 3. Trends in wage inequality and AFDC benefits by region, 1969–1980 to 1981–1992  
 
 
Returning to column (3) of Table 2, it can also be seen that, while price effects are not much affected by the 
introduction of state fixed effects, income effects fall markedly. Errors-in-variables in the income variable is 
one explanation for this reduction, but cross-sectional bias (high income states have high benefits) may also be 
at work. We will return to this issue when we use micro-level data on incomes. The fourth column in the table 
adds the demographic variables in the state. The coefficients on these variables are jointly significant. Their 
introduction further reduces the estimated income effect but has no effect on the wage coefficient.
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In columns (5) and (6) we test whether our results are robust to the presence of differential growth rates of 
benefits in different states by adding interaction variables between the state dummies and a time trend. With 
these state-trend fixed effects included, the coefficients on the other regressors in the equation reflect their 
relationships with year-to-year benefit movements apart from, or on top of, linear trends. The table shows that 
adding these effects changes a number of the coefficients but, while reducing the magnitude of the wage effect, 
leaves it positive and significant (the interactions are jointly significant). In column (6) the wage effect that 
works through the state-year trend is added back into the equation by decomposing the wage variable into two 
components, one equal to the value predicted from a first-stage regression of the wage on year, state, and state-
trend dummies, and the other equal to the residual from this regression; the state-trend fixed effects are now 
omitted so that their effect can work through the predicted log wage variable. This procedure is equivalent to an 
instrumental variables procedure in which the state-trend dummies are used as instruments for the wage and 
generate consistent estimates under the alternative model in which state-specific year-to-year wage fluctuations 
around trend contain measurement error but there are no true state-trend fixed effects.
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 The results show a 
much larger positive effect of the predicted wage on benefits than for the actual wage – and, consistent with 
this, a smaller effect of the residual wage (the average effect in column (4) falls necessarily between the two 
estimates in column (6)). Thus we find that, indeed, states with larger trend growth rates of unskilled wages – 
or, more accurately, slower declines – have also had slower trend declines in welfare benefit levels, confirming 
the results in Table 3 in a regression context.
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We conduct a number of additional sensitivity tests to this model and these results, including tests using 
different percentile points for both the low-skill wage and household income, using different measures of the 
wage, and testing for the effects of endogeneity in the tax price and other variables. However, we postpone a 
discussion of these tests until we use micro data to reformulate the median voter model. 
 
5. Results: micro-based median voter model 
In this section we report results using a micro-level survey on welfare preferences together with the CPS to 
determine the characteristics of the individual with median preferences in each state. 
 
5.1. General social survey 
The GSS is a nationally-representative, repeated cross-section survey which has been conducted every year 
since 1972 (except 1979, 1981, and 1992) and which interviews approximately 1500 individuals each year 
(Davis and Smith, 1992). Questions are asked about opinions and beliefs on a wide range of topics, and the 
question wording is intentionally kept fixed over time to be able to conduct meaningful time-series analyses. 
One of the questions concerns welfare spending. Respondents are asked whether they believe ―too much,‖ ―too 
little,‖ or the ―right amount‖ is being spent on welfare. The exact question is shown in Table 4.
14
 
Table 4. General social survey question on welfare preferences  
 
 
Fig. 4 shows how the answers to these questions have changed over the period 1973–1993. There was a 
pronounced shift against welfare in the mid-1970s, just after the welfare caseload explosion of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Attitudes liberalized gradually over the latter half of the 1970s and early 1980s, leveled off in 
the mid-1980s, and have recently taken another turn against welfare. The means of these questions over the 
period are shown in Table 1, which indicates that about 52% of the population believed spending was too high, 
19% believed spending was too low, and the residual 29% believed spending was at the right level. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Public opinion on welfare expenditure 1973–1993. 
 
It should be noted that the percent of the sample wishing to lower spending exceeds 50% in some years 
according to Fig. 4 and nearly 52% of the sample in all years wished to do so, seemingly violating the median 
voter equilibrium assumption. However, these percentages are from the full national sample and hence are 
implicitly weighted by state population. When data by individual state in each year are examined, the 
proportions answering ―too much‖ or ―too little‖ rarely exceed 50%; the average fraction (across all states and 
years) answering ―too much‖ is 47.3% and that answering ―too little‖ is 21.5%. This suggests that the answers 
to the questions are being given relative to within-state factors; that is, that they are within-state preferences.
15 
 
Taking the answers to the GSS questions as proxies for Bis*, our primary goal is to determine the characteristics 
of the median-preference individual. The most straightforward approach would be to select the individual from 
the GSS in each state in each year who has the median value of the GSS question, but this is not possible both 
because the preference variable is categorical – and hence the median person cannot be uniquely identified from 
the individuals in the middle category replying that the ―right amount‖ is being spent on welfare – and because 
the GSS sample sizes are too small to permit a reliable estimate by state and year. Our approach is, instead, to 
estimate a benefit-preference equation on the GSS as a function of income and other characteristics (i.e., the 
variables in Eq. 11) using the technique of ordered probit, which yields estimates of a continuous, latent 
preference index; and then to apply that estimated equation to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to select an 
individual in each state in each year who has the median value of the predicted index. The CPS has much larger 
sample sizes by state and year (generally no fewer than 300 or 400, and up to 6000) and hence will yield more 
reliable estimates.
16 
 
Estimates of the individual welfare preference models using the GSS data are shown in Table 5 (we pool the 
data over all years 1973–1990, giving us 16 339 observations). For the dependent variable we classify the 
answer ―too much‖ spending on welfare as the lowest category on the scale and ―too little‖ as the highest 
category so that the coefficients will represent effects on increased spending. The independent variables we 
include are listed in Table 1. Each specification contains a full set of state dummies interacted with year 
dummies. The inclusion of this full set of dummies allows us to obtain the effects of individual-level 
characteristics on preferences using entirely within-state variation, which, as we noted earlier, is the way the 
GSS question is answered.
17 
 
Table 5. Individual-level analysis of the determinants of welfare demand in the GSS  

 
In our first specification we restrict ourselves to variables that are in the GSS but also in the CPS. Price is 
omitted because, within-state, it has no variation if uniform taxation is assumed and is a linear function of 
income if proportional income taxation is assumed, in which case the income coefficient will absorb its effects.  
 
The first two rows in the table show a spline for family income, which is shown to have a negative effect on 
benefit preferences, an effect which tapers off with income. The spline break point of $20 000 is chosen on the 
basis of Fig. 5, which plots the GSS questions versus income. Apart from normal sampling variance, which 
induces some fluctuations in the relationship, the figure shows that support for welfare benefits declines rapidly 
initially and then levels off as income rises. The negative relationship between income and benefit preferences 
clearly supports a self-interest interpretation of preferences. The breakeven level of the AFDC income (i.e., the 
eligibility income level) is not far from $20 000 in many states, which further supports this interpretation. The 
negative income result is also consistent with a ―social distance‖ interpretation of preferences for redistribution, 
whereby those farther away, on the income scale, from the poor are less able to empathize with the poor. Within 
the context of the social distance interpretation, the failure of support for benefits to turn up at higher incomes 
signals that altruistic motives are insufficiently strong to offset the combination of increased social distance and 
higher tax prices. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Public opinion on welfare spending by income 1986–1990. 
 
The negative income coefficients found here are not inconsistent with the positive income effects found in the 
aggregate analysis in part because the GSS coefficients incorporate price effects, but also because they do not 
measure the same thing as those in the aggregate analysis. The income coefficients in the GSS reflect the fact 
that higher income individuals have different preferences for redistribution, perhaps for the relative income or 
social distance reasons we have suggested; but this is not the same as increasing the income of a fixed 
individual, holding that individual's preferences fixed. The latter can be positive while the former is negative. 
This is, in econometric terms, a case of a conventional individual fixed effects model where the omitted fixed 
effect in a single cross-section, which may represent relative income, is negatively correlated with income but 
cancels out in a fixed effects, or first-difference, model.
18,
 
19 
 
The other coefficients in column (1) are also of interest because they imply a mixture of altruistic, social 
distance, and self-interest motivations for benefit preference. That higher benefits are preferred by those with 
larger family sizes, who are unmarried, who are black, and who do less work all suggest self-interest motives 
because these variables are all positively correlated with the probability of being on AFDC (a social distance 
interpretation also could be given to these results).
20
 On the other hand, that higher benefits are preferred by 
those with higher education and by men is counter to self-interest explanations, and at least the education effect 
might reflect altruistic preferences acquired through schooling. 
 
It is of interest to compare the effects of the individual sociodemographic characteristics here with those in 
Table 2, even though the comparison is complicated by the same considerations we discussed for income 
(namely, the coefficients here may be picking up preferences rather than their effects holding preferences 
fixed). For example, percent black is strongly negative in Table 2 but positive in Table 5. One explanation for 
this difference is that the Table 2 variable is a proxy for a higher black representation in the welfare caseload, 
and a consequent negative attitude by white voters, while the Table 5 variable is proxying attitudes toward 
welfare by black voters.
21
 The college and age variables also have different signs in the two Tables. This should 
generate some concern that the state-level demographic variables in Table 2 are spuriously measuring factors 
other than voting preferences. 
 
Table 6 shows the coefficients on several additional variables added to the model. These variables are in the 
GSS but not in the CPS; nevertheless, they are informative and of independent interest because they consider a 
broader range of potential influences on welfare preferences.
22
 The estimates in column 1 show that those who 
were unemployed or who received government assistance in the past are more supportive of welfare, consistent 
with self-interest or social distance motives.
23
 Column 2 adds variables which indicate respondents' family 
values, opinions about the rewards from work, and views of own income relative to the average. Those with 
more conservative opinions regarding the role of women in the home and premarital sex are less supportive of 
welfare. Respondents who think that ―lucky breaks or help from others‖, as opposed to hard work, are most 
important in getting ahead, are more supportive of welfare. Those who consider their income to be ―far below 
average‖, and to a lesser extent those who consider their income to be ―below average‖, are more supportive of 
welfare than those with average or better-than-average incomes. This last result is consistent with our argument 
that redistribution preferences depend upon relative position in the income distribution. The estimated effects of 
the political variables in column 3 are not surprising. Democratic party affiliation and politically liberal views 
are positively correlated with redistribution preferences. Independents support welfare more strongly than 
Republicans (the omitted category is those claiming another, or no, party affiliation) but not as strongly as 
Democrats. 
 
Table 6. Individual-level analysis of the determinants of welfare demand in the GSS: additional variables  
 
.2. State-level regressions using median characteristics 
Table 7 shows estimates of state-level models identical in all respects to that in Table 2, column (4) except that 
per capita income is replaced by various forms of median income or the income of the individual with median 
welfare preferences. The final column also includes the other characteristics of the median-preference 
individual. To determine the income and other characteristics of that individual, we apply the estimates from 
Table 5 to the March files of the CPS from 1969 to 1992 and order the individuals in the CPS in each state in 
each year by their predicted benefit-preference index from the ordered probit. We then select the individual in 
the median of this distribution.
24
 Initial inspection of the data revealed that there was considerable fluctuation of 
individual characteristics in the neighborhood of the median-preference individual; that this could cause 
difficulties was confirmed by initial testing of these variables in the state-level regressions, which showed all 
coefficients to be insignificant. Therefore, we instead selected the central 10% of the preference distribution 
(i.e., all individuals 5% above and below the median) and averaged their characteristics for use in the state-level 
regressions. As in column (4) of Table 2, each specification includes year and state fixed effects and state 
demographics. 
 
Table 7. State-level regression analysis of the determinants of AFDC benefits: alternative measures of median 
voter's income  
 
 
 
Column (1) of Table 7 simply replaces state-level mean income by the state median income taken from the 
CPS, an accurate application of the median voter theorem if the median-preference individual is in fact the 
person with median income. The income coefficient is approximately the same as in Table 2 but is more 
significant, while the price and wage coefficients are somewhat more different in magnitude but retain the same 
level of significance. The major conclusion we draw from this result is that the use of mean rather than median 
income does not make much of a difference and, most important for our purposes, does not affect the estimated 
influence of the unskilled wage on benefits. 
 
In the second column we replace the median income variable by the income of the median-preference 
individual. The point estimate of the income effect is lower than in column (1) and loses significance, although 
the two are not significantly different because of the fairly large standard errors. The low-skill wage and price 
coefficients are now even closer to their counterparts in column 4 of Table 2. The interesting similarity between 
these results and those in column (1) arises in part because we found benefit preferences to be monotonic in 
income and in part because the other individual characteristics that have influenced the determination of the 
median-preference individual are fairly highly correlated with income. 
 
In column (3) we make an attempt to adjust for the fact that not all individuals vote. Since voting probabilities 
are correlated with income and other characteristics, the individual with median preferences is not exactly the 
same as the voter with median preferences. We use a question in the GSS asking respondents whether they 
voted in the most recent Presidential election to estimate probit equations for the probability of voting, as a 
function of the same variables in our welfare preference equation; we then apply that equation to the individuals 
in the CPS to obtain predicted voting probabilities, which we then use with the individual-specific predicted 
welfare preferences to calculate a weighted median-preference individual. Column (3) shows the results using 
the average income of those within the 10% band of that person. The similarity of these results to those in 
column (2) shows our results to be robust to the incorporation of voter selectivity. 
 
In the final column we return to the specification with the income of the median-preference individual but now 
also add the associated individual-level socioeconomic characteristics of that person (coefficients not shown). 
The income coefficient remains smaller in magnitude than that in Table 2 but is also insignificant, and the price 
and wage coefficients are not much affected by this expanded specification. 
 
To conclude, therefore, we find that our exercise in applying a more accurate version of the median voter model 
using individual-level preference data does not affect the results on the main issue in our paper, namely, the 
estimated effect of the unskilled wage on observed benefits. The distortions introduced by using state-level 
median income and state-level mean demographics do not significantly affect the relationship of the wage to the 
benefit level. However, the analysis of the GSS has provided some interesting evidence on the individual-level 
correlates of welfare preferences in general which may be useful in future research on other aspects of this 
topic. 
 
6. Sensitivity tests 
Finally, we report the results of conducting a variety of sensitivity tests to the model, many of which we have 
referred to in passing. The sensitivity tests often affect some estimated parameters of our model but, as we will 
conclude, they show the coefficient on the unskilled wage, which is our major concern, to be quite robust. 
We conduct our tests on the model specified in the last column of Table 7 but we show only the low-skill wage 
coefficient for brevity. The first test we perform uses the AFDC guarantee for a family of four as the dependent 
variable rather than AFDC benefits per person. As Table 8 indicates, this reduces the wage effect slightly, but it 
remains significant and of the same general magnitude as in Table 7. 
 
Table 8. State-level regression analysis of the determinants of AFDC benefits: sensitivity analysis of the effect 
of low-skill wages  
 
 
Next, we add the 75th percentile of household income in the state to the equation both to crudely test the 
median voter assumption (because other percentile points should be insignificant) and also to test whether the 
unskilled wage, because it may reflect a general increase in variance, is partly picking up the effects of 
increased dispersion in the upper tail of the income distribution. This change also has little effect on the 
estimated low-skill wage coefficient. However, the coefficient on the 75th-percentile income variable is itself 
quite significant, inconsistent with the median voter assumption (coefficient=0.168, s.e.=0.084). 
 
We next conduct several tests using alternative measures of the low-skill wage. We test the 10th percentile 
wage rather than the 25th percentile; the real hourly wage instead of the real weekly wage; the wage for high-
school dropouts; and even household income at the 25th percentile rather than the individual wage. We also test 
whether using a state-level cost-of-living index (McMahon, 1991) to adjust for differences in cost of living 
affects the results.
25
 As Table 8 shows, these variations generate a range of wage estimates of 0.098–0.268, 
which are generally somewhat lower than the coefficient in Table 7. However, all effects remain positive and 
highly significant. 
 
We next test the effect of using the female weekly wage instead of the overall wage as a simple test of the 
potential for endogeneity of the wage in the model. To the extent that welfare benefit levels affect labor supply 
of women, the equilibrium wage in the state labor market may be partly a result of benefits rather than their 
cause. In particular, higher benefits may reduce labor supply and increase the wage, leading to a spuriously 
positive relationship. If this effect is present, we should expect the wage coefficient to be larger when the 
female wage rather than the overall wage is used because over 90% of welfare adults are women. As Table 8 
shows, the opposite appears to be the case – the coefficient actually falls when the female wage is used (though 
it remains positive and significant). We take this is as an indication that significant feedback effects on the wage 
are unlikely to be present.
26 
 
We next conduct two tests for possible endogeneity of the state tax price. Since that price is a function of the 
caseload (although lagged), which is no doubt responsive to benefits, the potential for endogeneity is clear. This 
issue has been heavily discussed in the literature on AFDC benefit determination at the state level (see Ribar 
and Wilhelm, 1996, for a recent review). We first provide instrumental variable estimates using the ratio of men 
to women aged 15–44 (the sex ratio should affect recipiency rates) and the state financing share as instruments 
for price.
27
 In addition, to avoid having to make assumptions about legitimate instruments, we simply estimate a 
reduced form version by removing the recipiency rate from the price definition altogether, leaving only the state 
financing share.
28
 If recipiency is endogenous and if the consequent bias affects the wage coefficient as well as 
the price coefficient, the wage coefficient should be significantly altered in this specification. As Table 8 
indicates, however, neither of these tests has much of an effect on the wage coefficient at all. Therefore we find 
no evidence of price endogeneity problems that are connected to our estimated wage effects. 
 
Finally, we relax the restrictions in the simple fixed effects version of our cross-state, over-time panel model by 
introducing serial correlation in the error term through an AR(1) specification, thus accounting for within-state 
correlation. This introduction reduces the magnitude of the low-skill wage effect slightly, but it remains positive 
and highly significant. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have tested whether the decline in welfare benefits in the U.S. over the last twenty five years 
can be partly attributed to reductions in the wage rates of unskilled workers at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. Our results, based on conventional state fixed effects models, provide considerable support for the 
hypothesis. The result is strong enough that it can be seen from unconditional relationships between changes in 
unskilled wages and AFDC benefits across states from the 1970s to the 1980s, and it is robust to the inclusion 
of a number of other variables. 
In addition, our analysis illustrated a new method of implementing median voter models when direct individual-
level information on preferences is available. We used those data to determine who the median preference 
individual in the jurisdiction actually is to avoid some of the difficulties attendant upon using aggregate-level 
income and other characteristics to proxy those of the median individual. Our wage effects on benefits remain 
positive in this exercise and in additional sensitivity testing of the model as well. 
 
There are several areas in which further work would be fruitful. For instance, the availability of individual 
preference data opens the possibility of estimating alternatives to the median voter model, whereas in our paper, 
and in the previous literature, the median voter model is a maintained hypothesis. However, the available 
preference data have limitations themselves. While our results suggest that self-interest or altruism filtered 
through social distance influences support for welfare, additional data are necessary to distinguish between 
these motives. Such data could also be gathered for the purpose of discerning which of the voter concerns (work 
disincentives or equity) we have discussed is the most important factor underlying the low-skill wage effect. 
Alternatively, this question might be approached from a reexamination of the low-skill wage effect in the years 
following the 1996 welfare reform which should serve to mitigate voter concern about welfare's work 
disincentives. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Notes 
1
We employ the March Current Population Survey (CPS) in each year to obtain these figures. We use all 
workers, regardless of age, sex, race, or household headship status, and we divide annual earnings by annual 
weeks of work. The series is deflated with the personal consumption expenditure deflator from the National 
Income and Product Accounts. 
2
An insurance motive may extend up into the income distribution as well, although presumably not farther than 
the variance of individual transitory income warrants and not for groups (like married couples) who are unlikely 
to be eligible for welfare. 
3
The median of a sum is asymptotically equal to the sum of the medians of the components if the components 
are independently and symmetrically distributed (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973, p. 294). But income is 
correlated with the X characteristics, violating the independence assumption, at a minimum. Note that the wage 
variable in Eq. 11 is statewide and hence has no effect on the within-state preference distribution, and that the 
tax-price variable has within-state variation only because of variation in Y and hence can be folded into income. 
Thus it is the presence of the X characteristics that represents the most important difficulty in mapping 
preferences into income. 
4
It is important to note that the Bergstrom-Goodman result does not imply that the median-income voter is the 
median-preference voter; instead, the authors show that the demand of the median-preference voter is 
proportional to the median income in the state (under their assumptions), which is not necessarily the income of 
that voter. It should also be noted that the coefficients on the aggregate X variables in a state-level equation are 
not the same as the coefficients on the individual X variables in Eq. 12; the aggregate X variables go into the 
proportionality factor shifting median income to the median preference person. See Bergstrom and Goodman, 
1973 (pp. 286–287, 295–296). 
5
A few other papers in the literature (e.g., Bergstrom et al., 1982 and Husted, 1989) have used micro-level 
preference data as well. However, these authors stopped after estimating individual micro-level demand 
equations; they made no attempt to use their estimates to determine the median voter or to test whether the 
characteristics of the implied median voter could successfully explain the choice of the local public good. 
6
We begin with mean state income, rather than median, to follow the previous literature which has used mean 
state income instead of the income of the median-preference person. This is another source of disjuncture with 
the theory which we can treat more accurately with the micro data. We should also note that we tested in the tax 
price variable an assumption of proportional taxation, in which case the variable is multiplied by the ratio of 
individual income to state mean income, with little change in the results. 
7
In our data, the 25th percentile hourly wage and the 25th percentile weekly wage have a correlation coefficient 
of 0.61. The correlation coefficient between the hourly and weekly wages of high school graduates is 0.96. 
8
The fixed effects are jointly highly significant and the two wage coefficients are clearly significantly different 
from each other, so there is little question that a formal specification test would reject the no-fixed-effects 
model. 
9
It is easier to demonstrate the effect with regions than with states but it holds for the latter as well. 
10
This regional pattern of inequality trends is very close to that found by Topel (1994). He also found that the 
industrial states of the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic have experienced the largest increases in wage inequality. 
11
We might note at this point that the time dummies in all of our models remain highly significant, although 
reduced in average magnitude by the inclusion of the wage. Thus the wage is a contributing factor to the benefit 
decline but does not explain it all. 
12
At issue is whether it is better to purge the wage effect of possibly biasing state-trend fixed effects, as in 
column (5), or to follow the diametrically opposite procedure of purging the wage effect of its year-to-year 
fluctuations around trend because they may contain measurement error. We do not provide tests to discriminate 
between the two but simply present the results and leave the choice to the reader; both generate positive wage 
coefficients. 
13
By the principle of auxiliary regression estimation of linear regression coefficients, the coefficient on the 
residual in column (6), 0.175, should be identical to the wage coefficient in column (5). It is not because we 
have not included all of the other regressors in our first stage equation. 
14
The welfare question is known for wording experiments in which responses shift dramatically if ―welfare‖ is 
replaced by ―assistance to‖ or ―caring for‖ the poor (Heclo, 1986); we do not use either of these latter two 
questions. A question order experiment in 1976 placed a tax question before the battery of spending questions 
for half the respondents. This had no effect on average responses to the welfare question in the two groups of 
respondents, and therefore we use both groups in our analysis. 
15
The GSS question might be interpreted as asking for preferences relative to national welfare spending because 
so many of the other items in the list are national in nature (see Table 4). However, if most respondents were 
answering in that fashion, the majority of respondents in high-benefit states should be expected to wish to 
increase spending and the majority of respondents in low-benefit states should wish to decrease spending. In 
fact, not only is this not the case in the data, the fractions wishing to decrease benefits are slightly smaller, not 
greater, in the low-benefit states compared to the high-benefit states. 
16
We do not claim originality for the idea of estimating the coefficients on a continuous latent index from 
categorical spending preference equations; Bergstrom et al. (1982) did this as well, using ordered logit. 
17
This is a conservative approach because, if state and national variables affect the answers to the GSS questions 
either by affecting the reference point or by directly affecting preferences conditional on that point, those effects 
will be absorbed by our dummy variables and will leave the coefficients on the individual variables valid and 
unbiased estimates of within-state rankings, which is all that is needed to identify the median preference 
individual (which is the primary object of this exercise). 
18
An individual fixed-effects model is not the same as a state fixed-effects model but, as pointed out in prior 
work (Moffitt, 1993), the two models are equivalent asymptotically if births, deaths, and migration are ignored. 
If the population in a state is unchanging over time, variable means computed from a series of independent, 
repeated samples of the state population are consistent estimates of the means that would be provided by true 
panel data because the individuals sampled from are always the same. Consequently, a state fixed effects model 
would yield consistent estimates of an individual fixed effects model. 
19
Table 2 shows positive income effects even without state fixed effects, but this is still an across-state 
relationship and not the type of within-state relationship that the GSS provides. 
20
Unfortunately, the GSS usually did not ask welfare participation questions and hence we cannot, for example, 
estimate a ―probability of participation‖ index in the GSS and test that as a regressor. 
21
However, it should be noted, as we did previously, that the Bergstrom-Goodman result does not imply that the 
coefficients on aggregate X variables reflect the effects of the median voter's X. In addition, the Bergstrom-
Goodman interpretation of the role of aggregate X variables in a state-level equation breaks down completely if 
those X variables measure the characteristics of the recipient rather than the donor. See also Poterba 
(forthcoming) for a study of the effect of demographics on public choice. 
22
These variables are regularly collected in the GSS but, with the exception of political party identification, have 
not appeared in every survey year. Therefore, the models include a set of (unreported) dummies for each of 
these variables indicating observations with missing data. 
23
We attempted to discriminate between these two explanations by interacting current income with the indicator 
of past unemployment, on the presumption that high income individuals are unlikely to be motivated by self-
interest because their probabilities of welfare participation are so low. The estimated effect of the interaction 
term is positive, favoring the social distance explanation, but falls short of statistical significance. 
24
We ignore the influence of the residual when making the prediction of the preference index. We appeal to 
Lemma 3 of Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973 (p. 294) that the median of a sum of independent symmetric 
distributions is the sum of the medians, which we assume will hold approximately; since the median of the 
residual is zero, the median preference will be the median of the predicted index. 
25
The low-skill wage effect could be an artifact of (i) co-movement between the low-skill wage and local cost-
of-living and (ii) states partially adjusting benefits according to the latter. 
26
This is perhaps unsurprising because low-income female heads, even when off welfare, constitute only a tiny 
fraction of the state labor force. Also, Moffitt (1990b) conducted an extensive examination of whether the 
welfare system could have contributed to the observed growth in wage inequality in the U.S. (by depressing 
wages at the low end, from labor supply effects) and concluded that there was no evidence for such a 
contribution. 
27
Ribar and Wilhelm (1996) found that the ratio of men-to-women and the state financing share significantly 
predict the log price in the anticipated direction and that the state share survives a test for its over-identifying 
restriction. 
28
Recall that the price is entered in log form, so it is arithmetically equal to the sum of the log of the recipiency 
rate and the log of the state financing share. Taking the log of the recipiency rate as a function of the other 
regressors in the equation gives us an implied reduced form. 
 
